Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs

1991

Karen Anderson Stucki v. Franklin S. Stucki : Brief
of Appellant
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Michael W. Park; Attorney for Respondent.
Patrick H. Fenton; Attorney for Appellant.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Stucki v. Stucki, No. 914563.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 1991).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1/3842

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

UTAH .

JIM? S'Jr'PF.Vt

k'F jj

.Si

DOCKET
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

KAREN ANDERSON STUCKI,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
Case No. 14563

vs.
FRANKLIN S. STUCKI,
Defendant and Respondent.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

ON APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT DF THE FIFTH
JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF UTAH,
IN AND FOR IRON COUNTY
HONORABLE J. HARLAN BURNS, Judge

PATRICK H. FENTON
13 West Hoover Avenue
Cedar City, Utah 84720
Attojrney for Plaintiff
and Appellant
MICHAEL W. PARK
110 North Main, Suite F
Cedar City, Utah 84720
Attorney for Defendant
and Respondent

TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE

1

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT

1

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL

3

STATEMENT OF FACTS

* . . . .

ARGUMENT

4
5

POINT I. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION IN FAILING TO GRANT
ADDITIONAL ALIMONY AND EXTEND
ALIMONY BEYOND THE $12,000.00
LIMITATION OF THE DECREE . . 4 . . . .

5

< . . . .

8

CONCLUSION

CASES CITED
Ridge v. Ridge, 542 P.2d 189

7

STATUTES CITED
Section 30-3-5, Utah Code Annotated (1953)

-i

5, 7

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
KAREN ANDERSON STUCKI,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.

Case No. 14563

FRANKLIN S. STUCKI,
Defendant and Respondent.
APPELLANTS BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This case arose on a divorce, Motion for Modification
of Interlocutory Decree of Divorce and the failure of the Court
to grant same.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
On 22 May, 1973, the District Court of Iron County,
Utah, granted a divorce between the parties.
children to consider.

There were no

The parties had been married on the

15th of May, 1965. While the defendant had several children
from the issue of a former marriage, all had attained their
majority at the time of divorce.

The defendant was steadily

-2e m p l o y e d at the LLme o f d i v o r c e w i t h t h e U t a h S t a t e D e p a r t m e n t
*f E m p l o y m e n t S e c u r i t y .
;•-r Lor to tl le marrI age

the divorce.

9

The plaintiff had had failing health
di lri i ig til le n la rr 1 age and a t tl le ti m e of

There was a counterclaim of the defendant.

Each

of the parties was represented at the time df divorce and . ^
'.'-:'*..'"•
>•

n

• v »i>-

hpir position.

Al imony was awarded

;UM <>! $300.00 per mon» li unl. i. L Lin sum of $12,000 J u >

had been paid, wi i n ? 1 • *• *xj»r» :--, ^n^;u,-i/;c thai s;v>\i*- *.is i^ ~:*
of all property settlements and iill other items, with except inn
of attorney fees, court costs and plaintiff's personal be] ongi i lgs . Tl: le Decree was dated tl le 21 si: of June, 1973, and
filed thereafter.

The Findings of Fact contained a finding

in paragraph 4 Lhal plainLiU

^a>li:f:<

irom heart a i 1 mei it of"

a considerable extent, and ii is obvious to ^he Court that
her health is impaired.

*n addition, there Is a finding that

the defendant, in adu ii - <>< ;• ;>• in>; '-;U\'?dI i y employed, received
a monthly check from the Veterans Administration as a pension.
There is an express finding that the plaintiff should be
awarded alimony in I.lie snin of" $300.00 per mohth and terminated
when $12,000.0(1 has been paid*

A Motion for Modification of

Interlocutory Decree of Divorce claiming a change in circumstances of Lhe plaintiff, to-wit, further deterioration of
her healthy arid In addition, continued illness of the plain-

-3
tiff's father and his death after a long-term terminal illness,
the continued illness of the plaintiff's mother, and that the
improbability of inheriting anything from the plaintiff's
father as a result of the long-term illness had become
non-existent*

This was dated the 13th day of February, 1976,

and was filed prior to the time that the $300.00 per month
payments terminated upon the payment of $12,000.00, and was
duly filed on or about the 17th day of February, 1976, or
shortly thereafter.

That the Court denied same, and on a

Motion of Reconsideration on or about the 18th of March,
1976, a judgment without a hearing on or about the 19th of
March, 1976, which was filed the 24th of March, 1976.

A

second Order Denying Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration
of Plaintiff's Motion for Modification of Interlocutory
Decree of Divorce was dated the 1st of April, 1976, and was
filed thereafter.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The reversal of the Judgment dated the 19th day of
March, 1976, denying the Motion for Modification of Interlocutory Decree of Divorce and reversal of the Order Denying
Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration of Plaintiff's Motion
for Modification of Interlocutory Decree of Divorce•

~4STATEMENT OF FACTS
As indicated above, this arose out of an earlier
Decree of Divorce*

At the time of divorce, the defendant

was making $13,973.08 a year or $750.00 a month take home
pay, and $43.40 per month from the Veterans Administration
on a pension.

The plaintiff had been sick f0r many years

and had been treated by Dr. R. G. Williams, £ local
physician, plaintiff being a heart patient.

Treatment had

been in excess of 20 years at the time of diyorce.

There

had been heart surgery as a child, approximately 5 years of
age.

Plaintiff had been advised before marriage not to have

any children because of constitutional weakness and at that
time her employment was most limited, although at that time
she was employable for a few hours a day on properly oriented
jobs.

At the time of the Motion for Modification of the

Decree of Divorce, conditions had changed.

Tfhe plaintiff's

father had died, who had been a dentist, with) a reputation
around the community for some material means and a long-term
illness had exhausted these items.

In addition, plaintiff's

mother was ill and there is now no probability of inheritance,
although at the time of divorce there had been.

Plaintiff's

health had deteriorated to the point where shfe was now not

-5employable.

Defendant had retired and had been drawing

$15,000.00 to $16,000.00 a year and was retiring on that
basis from State employment.
had not been considered.

The exact amount of retirement

He was now not supporting a

daughter from a former marriage, which he had been supporting at the time of the divorce on a voluntary basis
helping her through school and spending approximately
$150.00 a month on her.

That what had been referred to as

school money was on occasion being used to pay costs of
the child of the former marriage on a mission at the time
of the divorce.

These items are no longer in existence.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.

THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN FAILING
TO GRANT ADDITIONAL ALIMONY AND EXTEND ALIMONY
BEYOND THE $12,000.00 LIMITATION OF THE DECREE.
This particular action comes under the provisions
of Title 30, Section 5, Chapter 3, Utah Code Annotated, 1953,
as amended.

There is no question this is a discretionary

item with the trial court.

The same judge presided at the

divorce as at the Petition for Modification.

-6There had been a material change in circumstances.
At the time of divorce, although a heart patient, plaintiff
was employable and was living with her parents, was an only
child and had considerable probability of inheritance.

At

the time of Petition for Modification, plaintiff1s father
had become deceased after a long terminal illness and exhausted
the funds of the family, and there was no possibility of
inheritance.

Plaintiff*s mother was ill and to some extent

plaintiff was caring for her.

Plaintiff had become unemployable.

See the reporter's transcript of the hearing of 22 May, 1973,
the testimony of R. G. Williams, M. D., beginning at page 2
through page 7, and specifically page 3, confcnencing at line
18 to line 30, page 6, shows very definitely a limited
employment capacity.
Mr. Stucki was steadily employed.

See transcript

of 22 May, 1973, page 32, line 24, in which the defendant
testified $13,973.08 and thereafter take homfe pay $750.00
a month and a pension of $43.40 per month, see page 33,
line 9, without debts, see page 33, line 27.
There is no question of material change of circumstances.

See the transcript of the hearing 1 March, 1976,

which show that the plaintiff is at the later date completely
unemployable, page 4 f line 27, which showed that plaintiff

-7was not to work at all*

Other changes in the plaintiff's

condition are shown on page 4, line 29 through page 5, line
16.

The defendant was on retirement.

His V.A. Compensation

had risen to $57.40 a month, see page 7, line 11, and he had
not made application for retirement, but was still drawing
the full amount, although he was at retirement age and had
taken an early retirement, see page 7, line 21. He had no
obligations, was no longer paying for a daughter on a mission
and the entire amount was available to the defendant.

The

trial court took the attitude that the language of the award
in the Decree cut off any possibility of modification and as
such abused its discretion, page 3, line 20 of the transcript
of 1 March, 1976.
There is no question that this is a discretionary
item and should have received consideration from the trial
court due to the material change of circumstances.

In

support of this, one looks at the case of Ridge v. Ridge,
542 P.2d 189, Section 30-3-5, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as
reiterated in the Ridge case provides for continuing jurisdiction in the courts to make such subsequent orders and
change of alimony and support payments, which shall be
reasonable and necessary.

-8There is no question in the instafrt case that a
modification was reasonable and necessary.

Alimony was cut

off at the $12,000.00 point, which had not been reached at
the time the Petition for Modification was filed.

Thereafter,

there was a definite showing that at the tirpe of Petition for
Modification the plaintiff was unemployable? no income, no
money whatsoever, no possibility of inheritance.

At the

time of divorce, there was a probability of inheritance and
the plaintiff was partially employable.

Defendant1s income

had increased to $15,000.00 per year and he was in the
process of retiring.

His pension had more than doubled.

His expenditures that had been being made voluntarily at
the time of divorce for the benefit of the daughter on a
mission and in school had been terminated.
CONCLUSION
The trial court erred in refusing to modify the
Decree of Divorce and same should be done.

Respectfully submitted,

PATRICK H. FIENTON
Attorney for Plaintiff
and Appellant

